We investigate if financial development eases firm level financing constraints in a crosscountry data set covering much of the European economy. The cash flow sensitivity of investment is lower in countries with better-developed financial markets. To deal with potentially serious biases, we employ a difference-in-difference methodology. Subsidiaries of other firms have access to internal capital markets and hence depend less on the external financial environment. As predicted, the benefit of financial development is smaller in subsidiary firms. This shows that financial development can mitigate financial constraints, and sheds light on the link between financial and economic development.
Introduction
The financial development of a country is correlated with future economic growth (e.g., King and Levine (1993) ). Possibly, this reflects causation from finance to economic development (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1998) ). But what is the detailed mechanism -how does financial development help the economy? We examine the potentially important effect of finance on firm level allocational efficiency.
Among the many potential benefits accruing to an economy with a well functioning financial system is an efficient allocation of resources to firms. Resource allocation across firms is known to be important: firm-and plant-level evidence show that the reallocation of capital from less productive to more productive establishments plays a significant role in aggregate productivity growth (see e.g., Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for firm-level productivity differences; Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001) and Roberts and Tybout (1996) for productivity growth and reallocation).
Because resource (re-)allocation across firms is an important determinant of aggregate productivity growth, this is a possible channel through which financial development might affect growth. To investigate this possibility we test if financial development relaxes the connection between internal resources and firm investment. The existence of a correlation between firm level cash flow and investment is the subject of a large literature (see e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) , Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Moyen (2004) ). We use a variation on the methodology suggested by Fazzari et al. (1988) --in a regression of investment on cash flow and controls for investment opportunities, a positive coefficient on cash flows indicates financial constraints. 1 We then compare the coefficients across countries (as in Love (2003) ), and test if they vary systematically with measures of financial development. To implement this methodology in a cross-country setting, we use the large Amadeus firm level data set covering 38 European countries. There are two important differences between our study and the standard approach. First, we use a difference-in-difference approach to identification. We compare differences between firms that are likely to face constraints to receiving external financing to those that are not, in countries that have high financial development relative to those that have lower financial development. To isolate a sub-sample of firms less likely to depend on external financing we follow Hoshi, Kashyap and Stein (1991) in using access to internal capital markets as the indicator. 2 The identifying assumption is that those subsidiary firms are likely to face lower financing constraints and hence will experience smaller reductions in the coefficient on internal resources (cash flow) as financial development improves.
3 This is a novel way of identifying crosscountry differences in financial constraints. It is feasible thanks to the availability of detailed data on ownership structures for our sample of European firms.
Second, our sample includes a large number of firms without stock prices (these firms are not listed on a stock market) and therefore lack the necessary data for measuring Q (defined as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity), the standard control for investment opportunities. We attempt, instead, to control for investment opportunities with alternative variables, such as lagged investment and industry-year-country dummies. 4 The disadvantage of using this large sample is that our controls for investment opportunities may be less informative than Q. On the other hand, unlisted companies comprise a very significant share of economic activity in Europe, so a methodology that allows us to include these companies will capture considerably more aggregate activity.
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Because we use a very large sample, we can include large numbers of dummy variables, carefully controlling for time and firm characteristics, including investment opportunities. Furthermore, bias caused by omitted variables will not affect the difference-in-difference approach as long the bias is similar across the various firm groups.
The ability of this methodology to difference out factors that may bias cash flow coefficients is very important. There are several sources of bias for the cash flow coefficient (see the literature section below for a detailed discussion) and dealing with them is the paramount empirical challenge when studying financial constraints. In particular, there are several variables that should plausibly 2 Hoshi et al. (1991) compare cash flow coefficients for groups of Japanese firms with varying degrees of access to internal capital markets. The first group has close financial ties to large Japanese banks (they were part of a Keiretsu) while the second group has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faced greater difficulty raising capital. The authors find that investment is more sensitive to cash for the second group of firms than for the first group.
3 Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) provide a theory explaining how conglomerates may reduce financial constraints for divisions. Campello (2002) provides evidence consistent with lower financial constraints for divisions in a sample of US banks. 4 Our baseline specifications, based on an Euler equation derived from a dynamic model of investment behavior, are drawn from the literature examining the investment behavior of unlisted firms (and are especially close to the specifications in Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay 2003) . 5 In our sample, listed companies account for only about 0.9% of firms, about 9.9% of employment and about 9.3% of total assets. Another reason to include unlisted companies is that listed companies may form a selected group with greater access to financial markets, so that local measures of financial developement (particularly those based on private (bank) credit) may be less relevant for listed firms.
be included in a regression of investment, and which are likely to be correlated with cash flow --an example is investment opportunities (see e.g., Kaplan and Zingales 1997) . If these variables are hard to measure, they cause omitted variables bias. As long as these biases are equal for subsidiaries and free-standing firms, we are able to eliminate them. We specifically consider possible violations of this assumption to rule them out. 6 In our sample of European firms covering 38 countries, the country-level data required in the regression analysis is available for 21 to 27 countries. We replicate the literature's findings that investment is positively associated with cash flow. As mentioned above, although this coefficient is interpreted as reflecting financing constraints, it might also reflect some other factor. Second, we find that conglomerate firms, which have access to internal capital markets, show lower cash flow sensitivities of investment on average, consistent with Hoshi, Kashyap and Stein's (1991) findings. Third, we find that the cash flow sensitivity of investment is lower in countries with higher financial development. All of these results are consistent with our hypothesis about financial development and firmlevel financing constraints, but they may be subject to omitted variable concerns and so we do not make too much of these findings.
Our main result is that, across countries, financial development reduces constraints more for free-standing firms than for subsidiaries. Under the assumption that biases in the investment-cash flow coefficient are similar for conglomerate subsidiaries and free-standing firms, this result identifies the effect of financial development on firm-level financial constraints. The magnitude of the estimated effect is large: the estimated reduction in cash flow coefficient for conglomerate subsidiaries as financial development improves is about a third of the effect for non-affiliated firms. In other words, conglomerate subsidiaries benefit less from improvements in financial development than free-standing firms. This is difficult to reconcile with alternative explanations of the cash flow coefficient, such as omitted variables bias (as long as there is no reason for this bias to fall faster with financial development for non-subsidiary firms). We attempt to rule out the possibility that our findings are driven by the peculiarities of internal capital markets, including expropriation (e.g., Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002, and Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002) and socialism (i.e., allocation from stronger to weaker subsidiaries, see Scharfstein 6 F o r e x a m p l e , w e c o n s i d e r e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t s u b s i d i a r y c a s h f l o w s a r e l e s s informative. To test this, following Bond et al. (2003) , we regressed future firm (and industry) sales growth on cash flow. The coefficients were not different across the two types of firms, or across more-and less-financially developed countries. The informativeness (as reflected in the Rsquare) for conglomerate status was slightly different across countries but in the opposite way to what could bias our results, i.e., conglomerate cash flows predicted future sales slightly better in less financially developed countries. and Stein, 2000) . Recall that our finding is that financial development reduces cash flow coefficients in free-standing firms but has no (significant) effect on subsidiary firms, and that the difference is significant. Theories about internal capital markets do not apply to the free-standing firms, where we see the largest changes.
We undertake a number of robustness checks and extensions of our basic results. First, we examine an alternative regression specification based on introducing a dynamic error structure to a static capital demand equation. The results with this alternative specification are very similar to the baseline results; we find that investments are less likely to be constrained when financial markets are more developed, and that financial development reduces constraints relatively more for free-standing firms than for subsidiaries. Because these regressions do not rely on the details of the model we derive, they constitute an important robustness check.
Second, we examine if our results are driven by the presence of firms in the financial services and real estate sectors, where measured investment behavior could be driven by a number of factors specific to the industry. These firms comprise only a small fraction of our total sample and we find our results robust to the exclusion of these firms.
Third, we check if our results are driven simply by broad differences in investment behavior for Eastern European firms. We include an interaction term capturing investment sensitivity in Eastern European firms, and also run the conglomerate firm regressions separately for Western European firms alone. Our findings suggest that the overall effects are not driven by peculiarities of investment behavior in Eastern Europe.
Finally, we test whether the weaker dependence of investments on internal cash flows in financially well-developed countries is driven by omitted variables correlated with per capita income. The concern is that financial development is generally higher in rich countries. However, many institutional characteristics may differ between rich and poor countries, and investment behavior may be influenced by these other characteristics. We find that unconditionally, dependence on internal resources is indeed lower in richer countries, but our results on the effect of financial development do not weaken when we control for differences in per capita income.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related research. Section 3 discusses our theoretical predictions. Section 4 discusses data sources and provides a sample overview. Section 5 presents the baseline results. 7 We also undertake a number of additional tests. The results are unreported but available from the authors (see discussion in Section 6.4). Tests include controlling for corporate tax rates in the same manner used with per capita income.
In Section 6 we examine extensions of the baseline specifications and conduct robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
Background and literature
The literatures on financial development and growth, on cash flow constraints and investment, and on the role of allocation in growth are substantial. Without doing justice to any of them, we provide a quick survey of the most closely related papers in each area in this section. 
Resource allocation across firms
Evidence supports an allocational advantage of financial development. Some comes from quasi-experiments using regulatory changes; for example, Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar (2007) show that bank deregulation in France changed the allocation of credit toward profitable firms and firms with good investment opportunities.
Across countries, the evidence is more limited. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) find that countries with better financial development see relatively more firms growing faster than predicted by internal accounting data. There are several differences between their results and our study. We use firm level data in our main regressions, rather than country averages. This difference in methodology means that we exploit more variation in the data, at the cost of some added complexity. We also make different assumptions on firm growth and investment in order to identify the effect of external finance. Most important, we study the effect of internal cash flow on investment, rather than the fraction of firms growing faster than predicted. In that sense, we extend Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic's results: better financial development not only helps some firms grow faster, it specifically helps firms which are likely to be financially constrained. Wurgler (2000) shows that the cross-industry allocation of investment is more responsive to sector-level productivity in countries with better developed stock markets. These findings are consistent with our results, but do not concern within-industry allocations (we analyze how investment depends on cash flow and productivity holding industry fixed). In practice, these benefits may well flow from the same aspects of financial development. 8 Our results also shed light on research establishing a link between input market frictions and aggregate economic performance (see King and Levine (1993) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) ).
Cash flow sensitivity of investment
We use the sensitivity of investment to cash flow as a measure of the frictions involved in the allocation of resources to firms as suggested by Fazzari et al. (1988) . They argue that if external financing is available without frictions and at zero cost, a firm's investment should be determined only by its investment opportunities, not by its internal resources. Empirically, they use Q (market value of equity over book value) to capture investment opportunities and cash flow to capture internal resources. They find that cash flow often predicts investment, and that Q often does not. Non-dividend paying firms in the US exhibit higher correlations between cash flows and investment than other firms. This is consistent with these firms being more constrained than others.
9 In a related paper, Hoshi et al. (1991) find that Japanese firms un-affiliated with a Keiretsu business group also exhibit higher cash flow sensitivities.
A large literature has followed these early findings (see e.g., Bond and van Reenen (2007) for a recent survey), attempting to use cash-flow sensitivity as a sign of financial frictions. However, concerns have been raised about the validity of the methodology. In an influential paper, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) make two points. First, they argue that the theoretical predictions are more ambiguous than Fazzari et al. (1998) suggest. Second, they argue that empirically, dividend payers are not necessarily less constrained than other firms. These critiques have been expanded and developed. For example, Alti (2003) shows that young firms will naturally have less informative Q than more mature firms because of their positively skewed future payoffs. Young firms' investment may be correlated with cash flow not because they are constrained but rather their cash flow contains information about short term investment opportunities beyond Q. Abel and Eberly (2002) make a related point: small, fast-growing firms may exhibit cash flow sensitivity because their cash flow captures investment opportunities, even if financing is frictionless. Gomes (2001) also suggest that Q will not properly capture underlying shocks. All these papers imply that non-zero coefficients cannot necessarily be interpreted as evidence of constraints.
10 Finally, it is worth pointing out that a positive cash flow coefficient might reflect managerial empire building, if that empire building is constrained by available resources (see e.g., Stein (2003) ).
We take these critiques seriously and will not focus on the existence of positive cash flow coefficients per se, but instead use a triple-difference type methodology. We first test whether cash flow sensitivities vary systematically with a country's level of financial development, as in Love (2003) . As long as other causes for the positive cash flow coefficient are constant across countries we can disregard them. However, cash flow coefficients are likely to vary across countries for many reasons, and do so in ways correlated with financial development. Hence, we compare the coefficient on interaction between subsidiary firms with free-standing firms in each country. Because they have access to internal capital markets, we expect subsidiaries to face fewer financing constraints than free-standing firms (see e.g., Lamont (1997), Scharfstein and Stein (2000) , Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) ). If countries have different legal, economic, and cultural environments that affect these factors equally in subsidiaries and free-standing firms, we can eliminate them by looking at the difference between the firm groups. We think this provides cleaner evidence than any previous methods.
Finally, a closely related paper in this group is Bond et al. (2003) , which studies the role of cash flow in investment equations for European firms from four countries. Like us, they study the differences in cash flow coefficients across countries. We extend their methodology of comparing countries, but our larger sample with more countries allows us to do so with more rigor. That is, we test formally whether cash flow coefficients are related to measures of financial development. 
Financial development and growth -evidence from Europe
Our paper is related to evidence on how growth, entry and exit depend on financial development and institutions in Europe. Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2003) and Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel and Woo (2002) show that rates of entry (and exit) at the national level are affected by regulation. Desai, Gompers and Lerner (2003) show that political, legal and regulatory variables affect entry and exit in emerging markets (i.e., Eastern Europe) but not in Western Europe. Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (2001) find that firm size is increasing in various measures of financial development. Our results concern the determinant of investment, i.e., growth, rather than static size distribution or entry/exit decisions of firms.
Theory and predictions
In this section, we explain the details of our empirical research design. We analyze investment-cash flow sensitivities and compare their magnitude across 11 B o n d e t a l . a l s o u n d e r t a k e c a r e f u l G M M -b a s e d e s t i m a t i o n s o f t h e r e g r e s s i o n specifications, which we do not. See also Love (2003) for a related methodological approach.
countries. First, we test if cash flow has a positive correlation with investment after controlling for industry-time-country interaction fixed effects as well as firm level controls. This would reflect some kind of financing constraints or one or more of the biases mentioned above.
In our tests, we will not use firm level Q (ratio of market to book value) as a control. Measuring Q is problematic for listed firms, and impossible for nonlisted firms. Since our dataset has a very large number of unlisted firms and our intent is to include the largest possible set of firms, we cannot hope to use Q. To some extent we are reassured by the general finding in the literature that firm Q generally has a weak relation with investment. However, we do attempt to mitigate the possible omitted variable bias from not controlling for investment opportunities by including firm level variables, as well as extensive industry, time and country fixed effects.
Our baseline specification is based on an Euler equation derived from a dynamic optimization model presented in Bond et al. (2003) , which in turn draws on Bond and Meghir (1994) . A firm holding rational expectations solves an infinite horizon investment problem with adjustment costs. Let per period profit for the firm i in period t be given by , , r , i s t h e p r i c e o f i n v e s t m e n t g o o d s , a n d δ is the depreciation rate of the capital stock. The firm maximizes expected present discounted value of cash flows:
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Let the adjustment cost function be quadratic and symmetric, as follows:
Then, the Euler equation characterizing optimal investment path relates marginal adjustment costs in consecutive periods and can be written as (see Bond et al. 2003 
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is treated as a constant, µ stands for the markup factor in a monopolistic competition framework, v stands for the returns to scale of the gross production function F.
Here the parameters 1 2 3 4 , , and β β β β are expected to be positive.
To see the intuition behind these implied relationships, consider the case with constant returns to scale and competitive output markets (so that 1 and 1 v µ = = ). For this case, it is easy to rewrite the Euler as follows:
clearly the LHS is increasing in the in the current investment rate
. Now consider a two period case where at the start of period 1 the firm is holding too little capital given the expected demand/productivity shock in period 1. Thus the above equation implies that current investment rate is positively related to the future expected investment rate and to the current average profits, and is negatively related to the user cost of capital. The payoff from increasing capital (i.e., investing) in period 1 comes from increased profits in period 1. Thus, period 1 investment is positively related to the marginal profitability of capital. Of course, all else equal, the lower the real user cost of capital, the more willing the firm would be to invest. However, given adjustment costs, positive investments today could lead to the need for costly downward adjustments tomorrow. So the firm would be reluctant to invest much if it expects poorer demand/productivity shocks in the next period. In the model, the firm's expectations about next period shocks are indirectly captured by the expected future investment rate. The higher the expected future investment rate, the less likely that part of this period's investment would have to be adjusted downwards in a costly way, and therefore, the higher current investment rate is likely to be.
To empirically implement the model, the one-step-ahead investment rate forecast is replaced by the actual investment rate and an orthogonal forecast error. Rearranging terms, and proxying for the real user cost of capital term using country-industry-year effects, we obtain a linear regression specification as follows:
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where
is gross investment normalized by fixed assets by firm i in period t, ROA is EBITDA/Fixed Assets (same normalization as investment), F i,t -1 is lagged output, K i,t-1 i s l a g g e d c a p i t a l , a n d t j, η denotes industry-year fixed effects.
Consistent with the theory above, note that ROA is based on operating cash flow before interest and depreciation (EBITDA), not net cash flow.
Under the null of no financial constraints, the coefficient 3 γ on ROA is predicted by the model to be negative. Under the alternative scenario with financial constraints, firms will be more likely to undertake investments when there are positive cash flows, and therefore, the prediction of negative coefficient on ROA can be expected to fail. 13 Thus, a positive coefficient on ROA can then 13 One intuitive way to see how a positive coefficient on profits may enter the regression specification is to note that the coefficient on the (lagged) user cost of capital is positive. The (lagged) user cost of capital (adjusting for borrowing costs) could be positively related to (lagged) profits for constrained firms -i.e., firms find it easier to invest when they generate positive profits. This could be because they are able to use the profits directly for investment, or because lending institutions charge lower interest rates when ROA is higher. Of course, this is only a partial/intuitive explanation; a rigorous derivation of the Euler equation in a model where the user cost of capital explicitly depends on ROA is beyond the scope of this paper. be interpreted as signifying financial constraints.
14 Hereafter, we refer to the specification in equation (1) as the Euler equation model.
We examine the effect of financial development on constraints for investments by interacting the ROA term (in the Euler equation model) with a proxy for financial development. A negative (positive) coefficient on the interaction term would be interpreted as a indicating a decrease (increase) in financial constraints with financial development. Also, we interact the ROA term with conglomerate status, as we expect conglomerate firms to be less constrained by their own profitability. Finally, we focus on the interaction between conglomerate status and financial development -we expect conglomerate status to matter the most in financially less developed countries. In Section 6 below, we consider a number of extensions and robustness checks of our basic specifications.
We once again remind the readers that the interpretation of a positive cash flow coefficient as evidence for financial constraints has been critiqued in the literature (see discussion in Section 2.2). Therefore our main focus will be on the interaction terms, rather than on the cash flow coefficient itself. Finally, note that the model is derived under the null of no financial constraints. Therefore, if the coefficient on the profitability term turns out to be positive, potentially indicating financial constraints, then the coefficients on the ROA and other terms will no longer relate to the underlying structural parameters as derived above. Therefore, throughout the empirical analysis, we will focus on the signs (and magnitudes) of the coefficients, and avoid any structural interpretations.
Data

Amadeus
Our firm-level data is taken from Amadeus, a commercial database provided by Bureau van Dijk. It contains at least some financial information on over 7 million private and publicly owned firms in 38 European countries. The database includes up to 10 years of information per company and is created by collecting data from 35 information providers across Europe, generally the office of the Registrar of Companies, and standardizing it. We use a sample of larger firms, for which data quality and coverage is likely to be better than the smallest firms.
We use the 2004 edition of Amadeus for large and medium firms, including all firms with operating revenue of at least €1M, total assets of at least €2M and 20 employees or more (for the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Ukraine and Russia the number are €1.5M, €3M, and 20, respectively). This sample contains approximately 1.5M firms, and spans the 5 year period from 1998 to 2002. Due to employee attrition and other reasons, the Amadeus data does contain firms with less than 20 employees. In order to eliminate the influence of very small firms that may have atypically high investment rates (because of small asset base) and investment behavior, we restrict our baseline sample to firms that employ more than 10 employees. We further limit our sample by imposing the restriction that value added, capital and sales or turnover variables must be available. The database includes firm-level accounting data in standardized format for balance sheet and income statement items. All variables are re-weighted and standardized using data on units.
15 Despite EU harmonization and international convergence in accounting standards and practices, there are differences in the accounting and these transformed accounts should therefore be interpreted with some caution. For the investment rate, we use gross investment, defined as {(Fixed Assets in year t) -(Fixed Assets in year t-1) + Depreciation (t)} divided by (Fixed assets in year t-1).
Our cash flow variable (used in the Econometric model specification discussed in section 6.1) is net income plus changes in deferred taxes, normalized by fixed assets (the same normalization as that used for investment). Profits (ROA) is defined as EBITDA normalized by total assets. The cash flow and profits variables were winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% to eliminate effects from extreme outliers.
In addition to financial information, Amadeus also provides other firmlevel information, such as industry and location information which we use in our analysis. Amadeus provides various industry classifications -e.g., national industry codes, 3-digit European industry classification codes (NACE) and US NAICS codes -which we use to classify firms and construct industry dummy variables. In our analysis, we use 4-digit NAICS codes to construct industry dummies, and also to categorize all firms by a 2-digit level NAICS code for industry interaction terms (see below). We classify firms as belonging to a conglomerate if Amadeus reports an ultimate holding company id number. 16 Specifically, we define three conglomerate dummy variables. The first dummy variable (D_congl) equals 1 for any subsidiary firm, i.e., any firm that has another company as the ultimate owner. The second dummy variable (D_congl (MNC)) identifies conglomerate firms that are subsidiaries of a foreign company, while the third dummy variable (D_congl (GF)) identifies conglomerate subsidiaries where the parent company is from a foreign country that is financially well developed. In other words, a Czech firm owned by a German parent is included, whereas a Swiss firm owned by an Italian firm is not. We use data on employment and year of incorporation to define size and age groups (used in tests discussed in Section 6.4).
The regular Amadeus files do not include banks, but it does include other financial firms. As one of our robustness checks, we exclude all firms classified as belonging to NAICS 52 and 53 (finance and real estate, respectively).
Other data sources
Finance. The ideal measure of financial development would capture the ability of firms with good investment opportunities (positive NPV) to find outside financing in case of need. Such a measure is difficult to come by across many countries, so we use three alternative measures, each of which has its strengths and weaknesses. Our first two measures focus on banks on the one hand, and banks as well as debt markets on the other. The third measure focuses on stock market development. Based on the financial database of Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001), we calculate the total volume of bank credit to the private sector, divided by GDP. We take an average of this measure over 1995-2003, spanning the period of our study. 17 We refer to this measure as "PCBank". Second, we use the market value of all outstanding bonds plus private credit, normalized by GDP, as a measure of financial market development. This measure is also from Beck et al. (2001) . Because data on bond markets is limited in some of the years, we define this measure for 1998, the year within our sample period for which the most data is available. Note that by taking these variables to represent finance, we disregard the role of outside equity. This may not be a severe limitation since most firms in our sample are unlisted, and hence may not depend much on outside equity. In any case, to capture the extent of development of equity markets, we use the commonly used measure of stock market capitalization to GDP ratio. This variable is also obtained from the Beck et al. (2001) financial database.
Sample overview
Following the practice in the literature, we avoid outliers by eliminate observations for which the cash flows-to-assets ratio, or the investment to assets ratio is larger than ten. Table 2 reports summary statistics across firms in our sample on key variables used in this study. We report three categories of variables: those used throughout; those used for the baseline Euler equation model; and those used for the alternative econometric model (discussed in section 5.2 below). In the sample used in our baseline specification (Column 1 of Table 3) , there are 702,639 observations. The general variables are PCBank, PCBB, MCAP, the three conglomerate dummy variables, and investment. About 17 percent of the firms are subsidiary firms, i.e., have another firm as ultimate owner. About 6.1 percent are subsidiaries of foreign companies, while 3.7 percent have parent companies located in a financially developed country (defined as belonging to the top quartile of the PCBank distribution plus the US). The investment rate is 0.37 on average, and the median is 0.168. There is a tail of considerably higher values. For the Euler equation model, we use the following additional variables --squared investment, lagged capital intensity and ROA (EBITDA over fixed assets). The gross profit to asset ratio (ROA) averages 0.74 and has a median of 0.40. For the Econometric model, we also use the variables output growth, capital-output ratio, and cash flow (after taxes and interest, normalized by fixed assets). Cash flow averages 0.529 and has a median of 0.284. (Beck et al. 2001) . PCBank is the total value of credit from banks to the private sector, divided by GDP. The private credit and private bonds measure (PCBB) is for 1998 and is also taken from Beck et al. 2001 . PCBB is the sum of private credit and total private bond market capitalization divided by GDP. The market capitalization measure (MCAP) is the ratio of total market capitalization to GDP. 
Country
Results
This section presents the basic regression of investment on contemporaneous cash flow and controls. As pointed out above, we cannot control for Q because most companies in our sample are unlisted. To control for desired investment (in the absence of frictions), we therefore employ the regression specification described in Section 3. (1) shows that cash flow enters with a positive and significant coefficient, which we interpret (subject to caveats discussed in Section 2.1) as reflecting financial constraints. The coefficient implies that change in profits from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile (change of 0.703) is related to an increase in the right hand side variable by 0.0428 (0.703 * 0.061), i.e., investment increases by 4.8% of fixed capital. Increasing profits by one standard deviation increases investment by about a 10.7% of a standard deviation. Column (2) includes an interaction of financial development and firm level profits. The regressions show that profits have a muted impact on investment in countries with higher financial development: the interaction coefficient is negative and significant. This negative coefficient suggests that financial constraints are less severe when there is better financial development. This is our main finding. The magnitude of this effect is large, and suggests that moving from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of financial development (across firms) will reduce the effect of profits by about 26.7 percent (from 0.0812 to 0. 0595).
Basic specification for cash flow sensitivity
Column (3) represents the regression for the subset for which there is financial development data on the PCBB measure of financial development and column (4) presents a regression with PCBB interacted with firm level profits. The interaction for this measure is also highly significant and larger in magnitude. Here, moving from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of financial development is estimated to reduce the effect of profits by approximately 57 percent (from 0.095 to 0.040). Dependent variable in all regressions is gross investment (normalized by assets). All regressions include country-year-industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country in all columns, so the number of clusters indicates number of countries in the sample. A plus sign (+) denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars at the 1% level.
(1) Column (5) repeats the regression in column 1 for the sample of firms where data is available on the MCAP measure. The results are similar to those in column 1 and 3. Column 6 includes profits interacted with the financial development variable. The coefficient on the interaction term is again strongly negatively significant indicating lower constraints in more financially developed countries. However, the magnitude of the effect is smaller, as a change in MCAP from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile reduces the effect of profits by 31.8% (from 0.083 to 0.057).
As outlined in the introduction, the interpretation of these results is problematic, because various factors apart from financing constraints may impact the regression coefficients. We address this issue by using a difference-indifference approach, outlined in section 5.2 below.
Conglomerates
All of the tests presented section in 5.1 and 5.2 are subject to the criticism that we do not control for factors that cause cross-country variation in the cash flow coefficient. These factors can include legal, institutional, and cultural factors, as well as accounting practices, or other factors that affect the correlation between cash flow and investment in a country. Hoshi et al. (1991) find that Japanese firms that form part of a conglomerate have lower cash flow-investment sensitivities.
19 They argue that conglomerate subsidiaries have access to internal capital markets which may reduce their reliance on external capital markets and ease financial constraints. 20 We propose that conglomerate firms should therefore have less to gain from financial development, i.e., their cash flow-investment sensitivities should fall by less than the coefficient of non-conglomerate firms. We apply this method to our sample by comparing cash flow coefficients between firms that are subsidiaries and firms that are independent. By comparing these groups of firms, we hope to eliminate country-specific factors unrelated to financial development. 19 See also Campello (2002) regarding internal capital markets and investment. 20 As Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) point out, conglomerates may reduce financial constraints for divisions but still make finance more restricted for the central corporation through equilibrium effects. Our results are quiet about this prediction since we only examine subsidiaries in the regression in Table 4 .
Table 4. Conglomerates
Dependent variable is gross investment (normalized by assets). Coefficients for control variables (see table 3) are not reported. In columns 1, 4, and 7, D_congl is a dummy variable that equals 1 for all subsidiary companies. In columns 2, 5, and 8, D_congl is a dummy which equals 1 for subsidiaries where the parent is located in a foreign country. In columns 3, 6, and 9, D_congl is a dummy which equals 1 for subsidiaries where the parent is located in a foreign country that belongs to the top quartile of financial development or in the US. All regressions include country-year-industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country in all columns. A plus sign (+) denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) The hope is that the subsidiary dummy identifies companies that, through their internal markets, are free from possible restrictions imposed by domestic financial markets.
We now check the difference between conglomerate and nonconglomerate firms in our sample. The results are presented in Table 4 . 21 For the analysis in columns 1, 4, and 7, we define a dummy variable (D_congl) equal to 1 for any subsidiary firm, i.e., any firm that has another company as the ultimate owner (see footnote 12 for the definition of ultimate owner). In columns 2, 5, and 8, we define a dummy variable (D_congl) equal to 1 for subsidiaries of firms located in a foreign country. In columns 3, 6, and 9, we define a dummy variable equal to 1 for subsidiary firms where the parent is located in a foreign country belonging to the top quartile of the financial development index (respectively PCBank, PCBB, and MCAP for columns 3, 6, and 9) or the US. The idea is that a parent located in a financially developed country may be able to gain access to capital more easily and channel it to their subsidiary through internal capital markets.
In Table 4 , the first point to note is that profits seem to matter less for the subsidiary firms (see row 2), which is consistent with such firms having access to internal capital markets and hence facing lower financing constraints. This finding is in line with Hoshi et al. (1991) .
Next, while overall greater financial development is associated with a lower dependence of investment on profits (as seen in rows 3, 6, and 9), our results suggest that the impact of financial development is significantly less for conglomerate subsidiaries than for non-conglomerate firms. This is reflected in the statistically significant coefficient on the triple interaction of profits, financial development, and the conglomerate dummy in rows 5, 8 and 11. These effects are highly statistically significant for all three measures of financial development. The magnitudes are large. The effect of financial development on cash flow coefficients is much weaker for subsidiary firms. In column one, for example, the coefficient on cash flow is reduced by 0.089 times financial development (the coefficient on Lagged ROA x PCBank) for non-subsidiary firms, but only by 0.032 for conglomerate subsidiaries (the sum of the coefficients on Lagged ROA x PCBank and Lagged ROA x PCBank x D_congl). The difference in effects is similarly dramatic for the other measures of financial development. In other words, conglomerate subsidiaries benefit less from improvements in financial development than free-standing firms, consistent with our hypothesis that financial development reduces financing constraints. It is harder to see how this can be explained by alternative explanations of the cash flow coefficient, such as omitted variables bias (due to lack of proper controls such as for investment opportunities). There is no reason that this bias would fall faster with financial development for non-subsidiary firms.
These findings are consistent with the theory that financial development reduces financial constraints for firms that are more dependent on external capital markets. They support the view that one function of conglomerates is to ease financing constraints at the subsidiary level (see Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) ). 22 This makes individual divisions less dependent on the external finance, and explains why financial development matters less for divisions.
Our approach using the subsidiary dummy to identify companies that, through their internal markets, are free from possible restrictions imposed by domestic financial markets, is not valid if cash flows are less correlated with investment opportunities in conglomerates. To test informativeness differences, following Bond et al. (2003) , we regressed future sales growth on lagged cash flows (not reported), based on the idea that investment opportunities are correlated with future output growth. The coefficients were not significantly different across the two types of firms, and the adjusted R-square was not higher for non-conglomerate firms. 23 Furthermore, there appears to be no differences between high and low financial development countries in the predictive ability of cash flows.
Differences in the informativeness of cash flow across jurisdictions might reflect tunneling or tax arbitrage. As evident from Table 4 , the results show no significant change when we focus only on subsidiaries of foreign firms (where tax arbitrage opportunities are different, see Hines and Rice (1994) ). 24 To check if potential differences in tunneling are important, we examined results (not reported) for firms with high and low ownership by controlling owners (<60% vs. >80% ownership) (where tunneling incentives vary, see Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) ). We found the results reported above were similar across these groups. 25 22 Our findings cannot be taken to mean that internal capital markets have no costs, or that they could not even be a bad thing on balance (see e.g., Stein, 2000 and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000) . 23 We also looked at the correlation between future industry sales growth and lagged firm level cash flows, as industry sales growth may be a more exogenous measure for investment opportunities; again we found no evidence that informativeness (as reflected in the R-square) was greater for conglomerate firms. 24 As discussed above, another reason to look at subsidiaries of foreign companies is that subsidiaries of local firms may be impacted by local financial development through its impact on the parent company. 25 Obviously, any factor that alters subsidiary investment on average will be absorbed by fixed effects. We're only concerned with factors that change how investment correlates with cash flow.

As an alternative approach to address the issue of tax arbitrage, we reran our regressions after including interactions of national corporate tax rates. Thus, if cash flows are less informative for conglomerate subsidiaries in certain countries because of transfer pricing or other manipulations by conglomerate firms in countries with higher tax rates, then the corporate tax interactions should address this bias. We found the baseline results robust to including this interaction (See appendix Table A1.1).
Alternative econometric specification
As a check of the robustness of the Euler equation results, we examine a second specification, drawing on Bond et al. (2003) and Bond and Van Reenen (2007) . This specification is derived by introducing second order (ADL (2,2)) dynamics into a static capital demand equation (obtained from profit maximization for a firm with a constant returns to scale, CES production function). In this framework, the capital demand equation for firm i in period t in the static optimum is: Assuming that the firm's optimal capital stock in the presence of adjustment costs is proportional to the static optimum capital stock in the absence of adjustment costs, and assuming that short run dynamics are stable enough to be approximated by distributed lags, a general dynamic regression model can be built from the static model above. Introducing second order dynamics using an autoregressive-distributed lag (ADL(2,2)) specification, assuming unit long-run elasticity of capital with respect to output, and rearranging terms, we get: 
While the model is derived easily by introducing dynamics into a simple static optimization framework, one drawback of this model (relative to the Euler equation model) is that the interpretation of the financial variables is ambiguous. While a positive coefficient on the cash flow variable could be an indicator of financial constraints, if cash flows contain information about future output, a positive coefficient may also be due to convex adjustment costs.
Given this concern, we focus on the difference between the coefficients on cash flow variables in countries with good financial development relative to countries with poor financial development. Also, as discussed in Section 5.2 above, we exploit the difference between subsidiaries and independent companies in their dependence on external finance. Specifically, we focus on the coefficient on the triple interaction term of current cash flow variable interacted with measures of financial development interacted with a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms that are subsidiaries of companies located in a country with good financial development (defined as the top quartile of the financial development indicator, plus the US). is referred to as the "error-correction" term, and accordingly the model is sometimes referred to as the error-correction model. We refer to it as the Econometric model, following Bean (1981) who first introduced this model in the literature. 27 Also, as discussed in Section 6.4, we test whether cash flow is more informative about predicting future output in countries with better financial development. We do not find any evidence that this is the case.
Table 5. The Econometric model
Dependent variable in all regressions is gross investment (normalized by assets). D_congl is a dummy which equals 1 for subsidiaries where the parent is located in a foreign country that belongs to the top quartile of financial development. All regressions include country-year-industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country in all columns, so the number of clusters indicates number of countries in the sample. A plus sign (+) denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars at the 1% level.
(1) The results for the Econometric model are presented in Table 5 . The estimated effects of cash flow on investment in this specification are similar in magnitude, compared to the effect of profits on investment in the Euler equation results in Table 3 , and are also highly significant, suggesting that financial constraints may be significant. More importantly, the interaction with financial development is negative and significant for all three financial development measures.
Using PCBank (column 1), moving from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of financial development reduces the effect of cash flow by about 31.2 percent (from 0.106 to 0.072). For PCBB (column 2), moving from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile reduces the effect of cash flow by about 66 percent (from 0.127 to 0.044), and for MCAP (column 3) moving from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile reduces the effect of cash flow by about 36 percent (from 0.108 to 0.069).
The results on the triple interaction of cash flow, financial development and conglomerate status are presented in columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 5 . These results are consistent with the results for the Euler equation model presented in Table 4 . Again, the magnitude of the coefficients on the triple interaction terms is statistically and economically significant, consistent with our earlier finding that financial development has a larger impact on financial constraints for independent firms.
Extensions and robustness
This section presents a series of extensions and robustness tests.
Excluding financial and real estate firms
Financial firms, as well as real estate firms, may have accounting data of a very different nature from other sectors which might affect results. While the Amadeus files do not contain banks, several firms are classified as belonging to NAICS 52 (Financial activities) or 53 (Real estate and rental and leasing). We exclude these firms, to ensure that they do not drive the main results of Table 3 . In Table 5 , we report profit and cash flow coefficients for the sub-sample without NAICS 52 and 53, for both the baseline analysis undertaken in Table 3 (in columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 6 ) as well as for the conglomerate analysis undertaken in Table 4 (in columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 6 ). The sample size is reduced marginally in both panels. The coefficients and significance is virtually unaffected by this exclusion (the coefficients on the triple interaction of profits, financial development and conglomerate dummy are slightly lower), confirming that our results are general to the sample and are not driven by the small number of financial firms and real estate firms.
Table 6. Excluding finance and real estate
Dependent variable is gross investment (normalized by assets). Firms with primary industry classification NAICS 52 or 53 are excluded. Coefficients for control variables (see Table 3 ) are not reported. D_congl is a dummy which equals 1 for subsidiaries where the parent is located in a foreign country that belongs to the top quartile of financial development (as measured by PCBank, PCBB, and MCAP respectively) or in the US. All regressions include countryyear-industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country in all columns. A plus sign (+) denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Western versus Eastern Europe
Our sample covers the much richer Western European countries as well as the poorer Eastern European countries (though with many more firm-year observations available for Western Europe). The Eastern European countries have much lower financial development as well as overall economic, regulatory, and political development. In this section, we undertake analysis to rule out the possibility that the financial development indicator matters simply because it separates Western European from Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Ukraine). In columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 7 , we rerun the analysis undertaken in Table 3 , but now include interactions of a dummy variable for Eastern Europe with the key variables of interest. 28 This effectively tests whether the PortugalGermany difference or the Latvia-Czech Republic difference affect profitability/cash flow coefficients, ignoring any differences between east and west. The results suggest two things. First, our main inference appears to hold strongly for Western Europe: in all cases (PCBB, PCBank, and MCAP), cash flow exerts a smaller effect on investment when financial development is better, as in our baseline case. This is reflected in the negative and significant coefficients on Lagged ROA interacted with financial development measures (in rows 2, 3, and 4 of Table 7 ). Second, the results suggest that within Eastern Europe, financial development appears to have little impact on the relationship between profitability and investment. This is seen by looking at the net coefficient for Eastern Europe. In columns 1, 2, and 3, the net effect of financial development on the profit coefficient in Eastern Europe is +0.192 (-0.107 + 0.299), +0.032 (-0.042 + 0.074) and +0.011 (-0.061 + 0.072) for the PCBank, PCBB and MCAP measures of financial development.
These results suggest that our baseline results are largely driven by variation within Western European countries. It appears that meaningful variation in the financial development measures is low for Eastern Europe. Given the transitional nature of the Eastern European economies, idiosyncratic country level factors are likely to play a larger role in Eastern Europe, potentially swamping the effect of financial development. Furthermore, statistics may be of lower quality in these new market economies. 29 28 Note that the mean difference between Eastern Europe and the rest of the sample is absorbed by the country-industry-year fixed effects included in all our regressions.
29 However, the data for Eastern Europe could be informative and hence we believe it is useful to include Eastern Europe in baseline analysis. When we run the analysis in Table 3 separately for Eastern-and Western Europe, the impact of financial development on the investment-profit relationship is positive and strongly significant for Western Europe, and positive but insignificant for Eastern Europe. (Results are available on request.) Table 7 . Geographical subsamples Dependent variable is gross investment (normalized by assets). Coefficients for control variables (see table 3) are not reported. Columns 4, 5, and 6 exclude observations from Eastern European countries. D_congl is a dummy which equals 1 for subsidiaries where the parent is located in a foreign country that belongs to the top quartile of financial development (as measured by PCBank, PCBB and MCAP respectively) or in the US. All regressions include countryyear-industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country in all columns. A plus sign (+) denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) In columns 4, 5, and 6, we rerun the analysis of conglomerate firms in Table 4 on the sample of Western firms i.e., excluding Eastern European firms. Consistent with the findings in Columns 1, 2, and 3, we find that results of Table  4 are robust, with the magnitudes of the key coefficients (on the interaction of financial development and profits, as well as the triple interaction between financial development, profits and the conglomerate dummy) very similar to the baseline.
Overall, we conclude that financial development improves financial constraints on investment for the sub-sample of Western European countries and that the baseline results are not driven by aggregate differences between Easternand Western European countries. 
Income effects
In Table 8 , we examine if the weaker relationship between investment and profitability (cash flows) observed in countries with greater degree of financial development is driven by omitted variables correlated with per capita income.
Specifically, the baseline results may be driven by differences in the relation between cash flow and investment between rich and poor countries due to omitted institutional and regulatory differences, and that financial development is greater in richer countries. To rule out this alternative explanation for the baseline results in Table 3 , we control for per capita income in Table 8 . The per capita income variable is constructed using GDP (in current dollars) and population data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database.
In columns 1, 2, and 3, we replicate our analysis in Table 3 but include an interaction of per-capita income with profits. Our results indicate that the coefficient on profits interacted with financial development is largely unaffected by the inclusion of the income interaction. In columns 4, 5, and 6, we rerun the analysis in Table 4 , but include interactions between per capita income and profits, financial development, and the conglomerate dummy. 31 30 Our results from undertaking a country-by-country analysis (available on request) confirm the general conclusion that investment constraints are lower in better developed financial markets. 31 Here again, since per-capita income is a country-year variable, country-industry-year fixed effects control the direct effect of per capita income and also the interaction term between per-capita income and financial development.
Table 8. Controlling for income effects
Dependent variable is gross investment (normalized by assets). Coefficients for control variables (see table 3) are not reported. Log GDP is the logarithm of per capita GDP obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database (in current dollars). D_congl is a dummy which equals 1 for subsidiaries where the parent is located in a foreign country that belongs to the top quartile of financial development (as measured by PCBank, PCBB, and MCAP respectively) or in the US. All regressions include country-year-industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country in all columns. A plus sign (+) denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars at the 1% level.
(1) While the coefficient on the triple interaction term of profits, financial development, and the conglomerate dummy is somewhat lower, it is still strongly statistically significant, consistent with the results in Table 4 . Thus, we conclude that our baseline results are not driven by omitted variables correlated with income (which is spuriously correlated with financial development).
Other tests
We undertook a number of additional tests; the results are available on request from the authors. The key findings of our additional analyses are summarized below.
First, we redid our analysis restricting the sample to those countryindustry-year cells which include 20 observations or more. We found very similar results to those reported here, confirming that our results are not driven by outlier industries, countries, or years. Second, we redid all our analysis using data on domestic credit and bond markets from the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS) database and obtained very similar results. Third, we undertook all the analysis in Tables 6, 7 and 8 using the alternative Econometric model. The results were very robust to using the alternative approach. Fourth, we redid our analysis including industry-age-size fixed effects and found our results to be robust.
Fifth, we analyzed a number of alternative GMM specifications, using lags of the right hand side variables (including interaction terms) as instruments (as in Bond et al. 2003 ). While we found the coefficients on key variables to be generally consistent (especially in sign and magnitude) with our baseline results, we found that in almost all the cases, the specification tests (the autocorrelation and/or over-identification tests) fail, and estimates are noisier. As an illustration, in Appendix 1, Table A1 .2, we report the results from using a system GMM and level GMM specification, using the first and second lag of the right hand side variables as instruments (results for alternative specifications are available on request from the authors). 32 The results here are consistent with the baseline findings in Table 3 and Table 4 . We find that financial development reduces the dependence of investment on ROA, that conglomerate investments have lower 32 For a detailed description and discussion of assumptions underlying the system and difference GMM approaches, see Blundell and Bond (1998) . In the difference GMM approach, all variables are first differenced to eliminate fixed effects, and the first differenced right hand side variables are instrumented using lagged levels. In the system GMM approach, in addition to the specifications in first differences, specifications in levels are added to the system. For the level equations, lagged first differences of the right hand side variables are used as instruments. To implement the estimation, we use Roodman's (2007) xtabond2 program. The difference GMM specifications yielded implausible and unstable coefficient estimates for many variables. dependence on ROA, and that financial development has less effect on conglomerates. However, the test for second order serial correlation (m2) rejects the null, contrary to the assumptions underlying the GMM approach; further, the Hansen overidentification tests fail as well.
33
O v e r a l l , t h e G M M a n a l y s i s suggests that the flavor of our baseline results is unchanged by instrumenting for the dependent variables. However, this conclusion is subject to the caveat that standard lagged instruments are generally not valid in our data. Since our main identification approach is to examine the coefficient on the triple interaction term between a measure of internal resources (ROA/cash flow), financial development, and the firm's dependence on external finance (conglomerate subsidiary status), we expect our approach to be less affected by the potential endogeneity of the right hand side variables. For the same reason, we are cautious in interpreting the coefficient on the ROA (cash flow) coefficient itself, as this is likely be affected by endogeneity issues.
Finally, we examined whether the effect of financial development on the relationship between cash flow and investment differs based on three industry/firm characteristics. These were industry asset liquidity; firm size, firm age.
Liquid assets such as cash may constitute better collateral for external financing than physical assets because cash is safer; it is less likely to lose value than physical assets. The financial constraints of firms with liquid assets would then be less severe and financial development would be less beneficial for firms with liquid (and hence more easily pledgeable assets). On the other hand, Myers and Rajan (1998) suggest that banks may be more reluctant to lend to firms with highly liquid assets as they may fear that managers could more easily manipulate assets in these industries. 34 To test these ideas, we use a liquidity ranking of industries based on US data on asset trades by industry, which we assume is applicable to the same industries in Europe. 35 In the baseline Euler equation regressions, we find no significant differences between high and low liquidity industries; however, in the Econometric model specifications, we find that the 33 For the approach to be valid, the error term is expected to have first order serial correlation (by construction) but not second order serial correlation, so tests for m1 are expected to reject the null, while test for m2 are expected to fail to reject the null.
34 Almeida and Campello (2007) find that cash flow sensitivities increase in liquidity (or tangibility/pledgeability) of firms' assets, if firms are financially constrained. 35 Our liquidity measure is defined as sales of PPE (plant, property and equipment) divided by net PPE, aggregated at the industry level (4-digit NAICS). In order to make the measure capture time-invariant features of industry asset liquidity, we take averages for 1985-95, the ten years preceding the sample of firm data we use. As an alternative we used an average spanning the 1971-2004 period, maximizing the amount of data, but obtained very similar results. This measure of asset liquidity/ collateralizability is closely related to one of the measures used in Almeida and Campello (2007). weakening of the relationship between cash flow and investment is less pronounced in high liquidity industries. This suggests, tentatively, that firms in industries with less liquid assets may benefit more from financial development.
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As with asset liquidity, one may expect the impact of financial development on financial constraints to vary with firm size or age. The theoretical prediction is unclear; it may be that countries with more developed banking sector channels funds more effectively to smaller firms and younger firms; however, banks may also have incentives to continue to lend to older and larger clients, to prevent defaults on existing loans. 37 Our empirical results suggest no statistically significant difference between large and small firms, or between young and old firms in the impact of financial development on the relationship between profitability and investment. 38, 39 36 W e a l s o l o o k e d a t a c a p i t a l r e s a l a b i l i t y m e a s u r e u s e d i n B a l a s u b r a m a n i a n a n d Sivadasan (2009) -the share of total investment in an industry made in the form of used capital. With this measure we found similar results for cash flow/profit sensitivity and also for the effect of financial development. We found some evidence that the conglomerate-financial development interaction effect is more pronounced in the less liquid industries, suggesting that conglomerates may be most effective in reducing constraints for firms in the least asset liquid industries in the less financially developed countries. 37 The empirical evidence on the role of banks in encouraging industry dynamism is mixed. Bertrand et al. (2007) find that deregulation of banks lead to an increase in entry and exit (suggesting tighter lending to older incumbents and better access to younger entrants). In contrast, Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) find that Japanese banks played a role in protecting old incumbent firms that were badly performing.
38 One important source of potential upward bias of the coefficient on cash flows is the possibility that profits/cash flow contain information on future output growth. This biases our results only if the information content of profits in a given country is positively correlated with financial development. Given the limited length of our panel, we conduct a crude test of whether the lagged cash flow predicts greater growth in countries with better financial development. We used a third order polynomial in lagged cash flow to predict one-year and three-year output growth. We then tested whether a one standard deviation change in lagged profits (around the mean) predicts a bigger increase of future short-run or long-run output growth in countries with better financial development. We did not find any significant positive relation between changes in long-run output growth predicted by a change in profits and financial development, suggesting that our baseline results may not be driven by higher information content in profitability/ cash flows about future growth opportunities. 39 We also examined if endogeneity of the conglomerate status might be related to our findings about relative differences between subsidiary firms across countries with good and poor levels of financial development. In particular, suppose that conglomerate subsidiaries are more constrained for unobserved reasons in both rich and poor countries, and that the distribution of constrained and unconstrained firms is independent of financial development. Then, if there are more conglomerate subsidiary firms in poor countries, they may appear less constrained relative to subsidiaries in financially well-developed countries simply because they are on average less constrained. We find that the empirical pattern is the opposite: there are fewer conglomerates in less financially developed countries.
Conclusions
Across countries, financial development has been shown to relate to growth. Could reduced financial constraints for firms with investment opportunities that cannot be financed internally be a mechanism? We test this using the correlation between cash flow and investment. In frictionless financial markets, investment would not depend positively on internal resources if investment opportunities have been controlled for. The fact that cash flow is positively correlated with investment has been interpreted as a sign that (some) firms are (sometimes) financially constrained. If financial development reduced constraints, the cash flow coefficient would be lower in a country with better developed financial markets.
Using econometric specifications that do not require data on Tobin's Q, we test if the coefficient on internal resources (profit or cash flow) is related to a country's financial development. We find that the cash flow coefficient is lower in countries with better financial development. Importantly, the effect is weaker inside conglomerates, which provides the main identification for our tests. This identification has the advantage of differencing out any biases that affect the cash flow coefficients of subsidiary firms and free standing firms equally. Unlike earlier research, we do not need to rely on the assumption that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow should be similar in different countries. We confirm the effect of financial development on reducing financial constraints for alternative measures of conglomerates, for different geographical subsamples, and with controls for income level effects. Our findings suggest how firm level financial frictions are reduced in a more developed financial system. Specifically, financial development is beneficial because it relaxes the correlation between internal resources and investment. Indirectly, our results address the issue of whether conglomerates are more efficient in countries with less developed capital markets (see e.g., Lins and Servaes, 2002) . Our findings suggest that conglomerates are indeed likely to fulfill a reallocation role, which is more valuable in countries where external finance works less well. We cannot address whether these benefits of conglomerates are large enough to compensate for the disadvantages of conglomerates (see e.g., Rajan et al. 2000 and Stein, 2000) . 40 40 In general, reduction of financial constraints should channel financial resources towards more optimal (high NPV) projects overall, instead of toward potentially less valuable projects in less constrained firms, and hence increase welfare. Of course, if there are other distortions, reducing financing constraints may reduce underinvestment or facilitate overinvestment (see Stein 2003) . Table 3 ) are not reported. CTAX is the basic combined central and sub-central (i.e., combined state/regional and local) statutory corporate income tax rate given by the adjusted central government rate plus the subcentral rate (obtained from OECD website). D_congl is a dummy which equals 1 for subsidiaries where the parent is located in a foreign country that belongs to the top quartile of financial development (as measured by PCBank, PCBB and MCAP respectively) or in the US. All regressions include country-yearindustry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country in all columns. A plus sign (+) denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars at the 1% level.
Appendix: Additional results
(1) Dependent variable in all regressions is gross investment (normalized by assets). All variables are demeaned of country-industry-year effects. All right hand side variables (including interaction terms) are deemed endogenous. Instruments are one-and two-period lags of the dependent variables. D_congl is a dummy which equals 1 for subsidiaries where the parent is located in a foreign country that belongs to the top quartile of financial development (as measured by PCBank, PCBB and MCAP respectively) or in the US. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. A plus sign (+) denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars at the 1% level.
(1) 
